Abstract-A developing trend of traditional industrial systems is the integration of the cyber and physical domain to improve flexibility and the efficiency of supervision, management, and control. But, the deep integration of these industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs), increases the potential for security threats. Attack detection, which forms initial protective barrier, plays an important role in overall security protection. However, most traditional methods focused on cyber information and ignored any limitations that might arise from the characteristics of the physical domain. In this paper, an anomaly detection approach based on zone partition is designed for ICPSs. In detail, initially an automated zone partition method, ensuring crucial system states can be observed in more than one zone, is designed. Then, methods of building zone function model, which do not require any prior knowledge of the physical system are presented before analyzing the anomaly based on zone information. Finally, an experimental rig is constructed to verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The results demonstrate that the approach presents a high-accuracy solution, which also performs effectively in real time.
s Which states can be described by v in z. b
Whether the states described by v in z are sufficient. 
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE rapid growth of information and communication technologies has motivated the traditional industrial control systems to seek tighter integration between physical process and cyberspace, creating the emergence of industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) [1] , [2] . However, integrating the cyber and physical domain significantly reduces the isolation of the physical system from the outside world, which increases their vulnerabilities and triggers a number of cyber security problem [3] . Indeed, the reports by the Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Readiness Team testify that the number of securityrelated incidents in ICPSs are increasing year by year [4] . Since ICPSs form an essential component of the national economy, any malicious invasion could have catastrophic consequences for the safety of people, the environment, and property [5] , [6] .
As the outer protective barrier, intrusion detection plays an important role in security protection, and it can be classified as either signature-based or anomaly-based [7] . Signature-based methods use a database or fixed signatures to identify attacks, and normally are effective with known intrusion attempts. However, due to their nature, they are not effective in detecting any new or unknown attacks. On the contrary, anomaly-based methods attempt to observe system behaviors or tendency, which increase the capability of addressing any new or unfamiliar intrusions [2] , [8] .
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Unlike information technology (IT) systems, the main target of cyber-attacks on ICPSs is to cause a catastrophe (such as hazardous accident or production loss) by manipulating and disrupting the physical process [9] . In addition, due to feedback control loops, the variables are closely linked, and an arbitrarily attack on the physical process would potentially cause the whole system to fail. If only cyber information is being considered, the attack might be neglected when the activities are hidden or the evidence of the attack is insufficient to be identified as an anomaly in the cyber domain. Therefore, relevant aspects of the physical process provide the key information for anomaly detection in ICPSs and must be taken into consideration.
Physical systems often present fixed model or predictable behaviors, which enables the analysis of anomaly from the physical process dynamics. These characteristics have been attracting the attention of many researchers, and the methods of physical system models [10] , state equations [11] , and statistical methods [12] have been widely used for physical anomaly analysis. However, models or parameters are hard to obtain in many real systems, and statistical data may be distorted by any disturbances. Further, most of the existing methods would be inadequate if the whole physical system was attacked simultaneously. Zone partition is often adopted for security protection since it is difficult for attackers to intrude several isolated zones simultaneously [13] - [15] . But the current studies on zone partition mainly focus on IT systems [16] - [18] , and few of them use the information available in the different zones to detect the attacks.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussion, we propose a zone-partition-based anomaly detection approach. In this approach, a zone partition algorithm is designed to divide the physical states into multiple zones, and a zone function is extracted to observe the crucial states in each zone. Through cross comparing the crucial states between zones with the criteria of tendency and error, anomaly can be detected effectively. More specifically, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) A zone-partition-based anomaly detection approach is proposed, which can detect both known and unknown cyber-attacks effectively even when several zones are compromised simultaneously. 2) An automatic partition algorithm is designed for observing a crucial state in multiple zones, thereby enabling an anomaly detectable in surviving zones. And the system can be partitioned with few manual interventions, which greatly reduces the implementation complexity.
3) The zone observation function of crucial states is approximated by neural network, and this method overcomes the difficulty in accurate physical process modeling of many real systems. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the current anomaly detection technologies in ICPSs, and the purpose of zone partition on security protection. The architecture of the proposed approach is described in Section III. The zone partition method and zone-based anomaly analysis method are presented in Sections IV and V, respectively. In Section VI, a physical testbed is built for analyzing and verifying the proposed approach, and then, the accuracy and real-time performance are discussed. The concluding remarks and future work are detailed in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
ICPSs are the integrations of computation, communication, and physical processes, where the cyber and physical domains are tightly linked [19] . Security incidents in ICPSs are not limited in cyber space, they may also have a direct impact on the physical world [20] . Therefore, anomaly detection in ICPSs should not be limited only to cyber domain; anomaly in the physical systems also needs to be seriously considered.
A. Anomaly Detection in ICPSs
In recent years, anomaly detection both in the cyber and physical domain has been widely studied in ICPSs. From the point of view of the cyber domain, the main focus is on the analysis of traffic, protocol, behavior, etc. using the methods of statistics-based, model-based, machine-learning-based, etc.
[21]- [23] . However, there are some limitations in these methods, such as the following.
1) It is hard to describe deeply all of the industrial protocols due to their diversity and complexity. Thus, the problems of false negative and false positive are difficult to solve [7] . 2) The purpose of any attacks is to destroy physical processes, and the abnormal behaviors consequently may not be reflected in the cyber domain.
3) The source of the attacks is not purely from the cyber network, but also could arise from unsafe media, such as Stuxnet that intruded into Siemens systems via removable storage devices [24] . The worse scenario is that, the action of a deliberate sabotaging behavior activity on physical system could result in a catastrophic accident. Therefore, it is essential to detect the anomaly in the physical domain of ICPSs.
Statistical methods, such as Shewhart chart, cumulative sum (CUSUM), and exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), have been widely used for anomaly detection in physical processes [10] , [12] . Hu et al. [25] employed the Hotelling's T 2 statistic to handle multivariate anomaly detection problem in control systems. Harrou et al. [26] integrated principle component analysis (PCA) and EWMA to develop two processmonitoring-detection tools, T 2 -EWMA and Q-EWMA, which exhibited an effective approach to balance the false negative rate (FNR) and false positive rate (FPR). But as disturbances are inevitable and process data are undulate, these methods present some limitations. Besides, once the operation condition is changed, the statistical distribution will be no longer effective. Similarly, system state equation has been regarded as another research idea, and it is not subject to the limitation of operation conditions. Cárdenas et al. [10] used the system state equation to predict expected outputs, and compared it with the value from measured sensors, CUSUM was then introduced to make an anomaly analysis decision. Pasqualetti et al. [27] proposed a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems and attack detection based on geometric control theory, which char-acterized undetectable and unidentifiable attacks perspectives. However, the expression of the system model or state equation requires professional knowledge, and the parameters are hard to know or imprecise in actual field systems. These proposed methods also would be useless if all the infected data conform to the system model.
B. Zone Partition for Security Protection
Zone partition that introduced in IEC62443 [13] is an effect way to prevent the whole system from breaking down since attacks can hardly penetrate into multiple isolated zones simultaneously, and it also can be used for facilitating detailed risk assessment, identifying security measures requirement, protecting system safety, and so on [14] . Genge et al. [16] regarded the design of industrial systems as an integer linear programming problem, and designed a secure scheme based on "zones and conduits." Jin et al. [17] partitioned the business subsystems of military information system (MIS) into different secure domains, and proposed an MIS access control method based on security domain oriented administrative role based control model to manage and control the secure domains. As a secure strategy of intrusion response, Jee et al. [18] controlled the communication by network control center to prevent the vicious attacks and invasions spreading to other subsystems through partitioning and isolating the infected subsystems. But these studies just considered the isolation protection strategies and mainly focused on IT system. And none of them touched on the physical system of ICPSs.
Zone partition is also an effective and reliable approach that can be used for security protection and anomaly analysis. Krishnan et al. [28] used an adaptive distributed algorithm to detect large-scale intrusions by partitioning sensors into multiple virtual "computational domains" within a relation graph. Hashimoto et al. [14] constructed a series of cause-effect matrices from the relationship of the field physical devices, and evaluated whether the zone partition result were satisfactory for cyber-attacks detection. And on the basis of this, the group [15] designed a zone partition method based on fault trees, which were constructed with the purpose of ensuring system safety, and employed PCA to detect cyber-attacks. But the detection method did not rely on the partitioned zones, and the partition method was manual, which proved very cumbersome when the result deviated from the expected values.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF ANOMALY DETECTION FOR ICPSS
An anomaly detection approach based on zone partition is proposed in this paper, and the main procedure is summarized as follows. First, an automatic zone partition algorithm based on the causal model of the physical system is designed to ensure that each crucial state can be observed in multiple zones, where the crucial state refers to an important state of the system whose anomaly may reflect the variation of the system performance/productivity, and/or result in some safety problems. Next, zone function is constructed to describe the crucial states in each divided zone, where an feedforward neural network (FNN) is adopted. Finally, the anomaly analysis criteria and methods are presented in keeping with the approximated zone functions. The corresponding architecture is shown in Fig. 1 , which includes three modules: zone partition, zone modeling, and anomaly detection. The first two modules are offline, and the last module is online.
In the zone partition module, the partition criteria, which consist of the information pertaining to control loops and variable relationships, are initially presented. Based on this information, the physical system will be divided into multiple zones using the designed partition algorithm. In the zone modeling module, FNN is constructed to approximate the function for the crucial states in each zone, where the zone information is used. In the anomaly detection module, the physical system data are first preprocessed. Then, the values of the crucial states in each zone are calculated in the distributed feature computation part. Finally the observed values of each crucial state are compared between different zones, and anomaly can be recognized according to the detection criteria and the comparison of results.
IV. ZONE PARTITION ALGORITHM OF PHYSICAL SYSTEM FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
As aforementioned, the proposed anomaly detection method is based on the crucial states, which could be observed in different zones. Thus, the primary task is how to divide the physical system into multiple zones. This section presents a detectable zone partition method, based on the cause-effect relationships in physical process systems. Initially, a universal causal model for a target node is introduced, and then an automatic partition algorithm is proposed.
A. Causal Model
Causal models describe the cause-effect relationships among process variables, shows the propagation of influence, and have been widely used in industrial systems [29] , [30] . It is composed by nodes and directed arcs, where nodes represent the system state variables, and the directed arc connecting two nodes represents the effect direction of propagation. If two adjacent nodes can affect each other, the arc should be bidirectional [31] .
In this paper, a causal model is used to express the qualitative relationships among the variables of a physical system. For a target node s (an analyzed variable), its causal model can be divided into two parts: cause nodes and effect nodes. Cause nodes are those which can affect s, and effect nodes are those which can be affected by s. Fig. 2(a) 
B. Zone Partition Method
A causal model of a physical system represents the interrelations of all the variables, and if one or part of variables are infected, the anomaly would be revealed from the other variables. The purpose of zone partition in this paper is to separate these associated variables into different zones, and ensure that the anomaly can be reflected in the surviving zones.
According to the qualitative summary of the causal model, the state s can be observed by itself, all the elements in c s , and each element in e s individually. Let c s = {c [1, n] } denote the cause set and the effect set for s, respectively, m and n are the number of elements in these two set. A set named detectable set is defined for s:
where "⊕" denotes that each set in the expression is regarded as a mutual independent element, such as d 
Zone partition for a complex system by manual means is time consuming. An automatic partition algorithm is proposed in this paper. The principle and procedure of the partition for each crucial state s i are summarized in Algorithm 1, where "∅" denotes the empty set, Λ denotes a temporary set for zone information, and set s denotes all the crucial states. Each element in d s i is initially regarded as an independent zone, and the corresponding zone information of s and b are added to it. And as the conflicts are not disposed when constructing d s i , each element in the original d s i has the ability to fully infer the state of s. Thus, all the states in b are initialized with 1. However, there may be some conflicts between the divided zones, such as a variable is placed into several zones, which has been previously mentioned in Section IV-A, and variables in a control loop are separated. In the algorithm, any broken control loops are repaired first. If there are some intersections between the variables in a zone and in a partner set, all other variables in the partner set should be merged into this zone. In this way, any conflict where a variable exists in multiple zones is solved. If a zone overlaps with any of all others, the overlapped variables should be removed from this zone. Meanwhile, the corresponding state in b should be changed to 0. If all the variables in a zone are removed, this zone should also be removed.
Algorithm 1 only realizes the partition for each crucial state, but there may be some intersections and contradictions between the zones for other physical states. Additionally, the magnitude of the zone amount will be huge for a complex system. An algorithm has been designed to address these problems and is shown as in Algorithm 2, where the set λ is used for recording the zones, which overlap a specific zone. First, if there is an inclusion relation between two zones, these two zones should be merged directly. After reviewing the inclusion relations, if there remains intersections between any two zones, the corresponding zone numbers need to be recorded in λ. For example, if z i ⊆ z j , we should place all the zone information in z i into z j , and remove z i from z. Then, if there is some overlap between z j and z k , numbers j, k should be added into λ k , λ j accordingly. Finally, if the recorded amount in a zone is more than 2, the corresponding zone should be removed, and the zone number of this zone should be removed from all other λ. If the recorded amount in one of the remaining zones is equal to 2, the two overlapped zones should be merged. For example, if λ i = λ j = {i, j}, and both i, j do not belong to any other λ, z i and z j can be merged.
It is worth mentioning that the terminal condition of the zone partition is that no conflicts will exist between any zones. Therefore, there are many kinds of partitioning that may result from this method, which could lead to cost different resources and/or different effectiveness of any security protection, but these issues are beyond the focus of this paper.
V. ZONE-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
The detectable zone partition method mentioned previously ensures that the states of the target nodes (crucial states) can be observed in multiple zones. It is necessary to build accurate function model for the crucial states in each zone for anomaly detection. In this section, a method based on FNN is used to build the zone function model, and the criteria for anomaly analysis in each zone is proposed.
A. Zone Function Modeling
Simply, when the crucial state s i exists inz j , the state can be easily obtained by the corresponding sensor. But for other sets, such asz k (k = j), it needs to build an accurate function model to describe s i . In principle, the model is built by a precise expression from system modeling or multivariate fitting. However, this is hard in practice due to the lack of modeling knowledge. In this paper, backpropagation neural network (BP-NN) is used for zone function approximation, which has the abilities of mapping and learning without any prior knowledge of the object systems, and approximating to arbitrary continuous function [32] .
In zone a (z a ), letz a .v = {x a i |i = 1 to m}, and the crucial states of s = {s k |k = 1 to n} could be described in this zone. is the weight between the th hidden neuron and s k . The training of the weight ω and w continues until mean square error falls below some threshold or tolerance level (σ), which is given by
Because negative factors do exist in actual systems, such as system disturbance, sensor precision, and actuator response time, data extraction for training set is indispensable. An extraction method is proposed in this paper, which is
and the threshold δ a should satisfy
where ζ a = {ζ a i |i = 1 to m} are the sensors' resolution, and ν a is the maximum system disturbance, which can be obtained from specifications and test. O a is correspondingly extracted from the sample dataset.
B. Anomaly Analysis
If a system has not been attacked, the crucial states in each zone are normal. Thus, the description for the same crucial state in any two zones should be consistent. In this paper, two basic criteria, tendency and error between any two curves, are adopted to evaluate the consistency for the description of a same crucial state. First, to inspect the consistency of tendency, crosscorrelation algorithm [34] , which describes the pertinence of two curves is used, which given by
where R are steady, the disturbance will influence the calculation results seriously. In this paper, to reduce the negative effects caused by the disturbance, a carrier curve L is used to replace the original curve Z in (7), which is given by
where
is the carrier coefficient. If a system has not been invaded, the cross-correlation coefficient should satisfy
where γ a,b s k is the minimum acceptable correlation of the curves between zone a and b for the crucial state s k .
The cross-correlation coefficient only reflects the tendency of two curves, and the error E between two curves that reflects their accuracy for a same crucial state should also be taken into account, which is given by
and the errors should satisfy
where ε a,b s k is the maximum acceptable error of the curves between zone a and b for the crucial state s k .
In this paper, the distinguishing line between the normal and outlier is if either of the two criteria exceed the corresponding threshold. Additionally, γ and ε can be determined by the training results of the BP-NN.
VI. EXPERIMENT ON TESTBED

A. Description of Testbed
To verify the viability and assess the performance of the proposed approach, a physical testbed named coupling tank control system (CTCS) is constructed first. As shown in Fig. 3 , CTCS is a simple cyclic water supplying system among three tanks, and the level in each tank is regulated by the proportional and automatic valves. Liquidometers are placed for measuring the real-time liquid level, and in the pipeline between 1 # and 3 # tank, there are a flowmeter and a piezometer. The water circulation depends on the pump and the pressure differential in the different tanks. The main objective of the system is to keep the liquid level in 1 # and 2 # tank stable. In addition, in CTCS, the controllers consist of power line carriers (PLCs), which are uniformly supervised and managed by human machine interface (HMI).
B. Zone Partition
In CTCS, the liquid levels in the three tanks are the most important states for safety consideration. Thus, the crucial states can be defined as {L 1 , L 2 , L 3 }, and its causal model is shown in Fig. 4 . As F 2 and F 3 are not detectable signals, the two nodes are not taken into account. As the liquid levels in 1 # and 2 # tank are the control object, the partner set is
According to the causal model shown in Fig 4, 
(c) Results by Algorithm 2
into three zones, which are
, and
Then, two conflicts can be found in these three zones: V 1 is assigned into z 1 , while L 1 is assigned into z 3 , but L 1 , V 1 belong to a same partner set, and V 2 is assigned into both z 1 and z 2 . Based on the disposing mechanism, these conflicts can be handled by removing V 1 and V 2 from z 1 . Additionally, the corresponding state in b needs to be changed to 0. The disposing results by Algorithm 1 are shown in Table I(b) . However, there are some conflicts between the zones for different crucial states, such as z 3 ⊆ z 4 , z 6 ⊆ z 2 ⊆ z 7 , and z 5 overlaps with z 2 , z 7 , and z 8 . These conflicts will be handled by Algorithm 2, and the results are shown in Table I (c). But as the state of v inz 4 is 0, they will not be of any help for crucial state description. Finallyz 4 is merged intoz 3 . Although the anomaly already can be inferred regardless of which one of them is infected, such as ifz 1 is invaded, then R
, an additional consequence can also be inferred. The state of L 2 also can be observed by the variables inz 1 when V 3 is fixed. According to the differential algebra equation
where k V 3 is the coefficient of valve V 3 (a constant), A 1 and A 2 are the cross-sectional areas of the corresponding tanks, and L 2 is only affected by L 1 and F 1 . And as F 1 is only affected by V 1 , L 2 can be observed by L 1 and V 1 . Therefore, in partitioned CTCS, states L 1 and L 2 can be inferred in bothz 1 andz 2 , and the state L 3 can be inferred inz 2 andz 3 . Additionally, the variation of the level is used for representing the corresponding state. 
C. Experiment and Result Analysis
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach through a series of experiments using the testbed. Initially, the approximation capability and anomaly detection ability of zone function is verified. And on the basis of this, the detection accuracy (DA) and real-time performance are discussed. Finally, the merits of the approach are summarized and discussed.
1) Effectiveness of Zone Function Model for Anomaly
Detection: There are two stages to verification using the proposed method: Training the network for function approximation in each zone, and verifying the detection ability based on the approximated functions. About 3000 operation data are collected in each zone, and some 80% are used for training and the remaining 20% for the test. Fig. 5 shows the approximation performance of the zone functions, where "measured" denotes that the value is obtained from the corresponding sensor, "estimated" denotes that the value is calculated by zone function, 
Notes: τ = 0, W = 50, and α = 0.005. Table II .
Next, a spoofing attack is used to verify the detection ability of the trained model, which modifies the configuration of the set point of L 1 and deceives all the measured values from PLCs to HMI since the instant of 70 inz 1 . Fig. 6 shows the correlations and errors in different zones. As all the variables inz 1 are deceived, the crucial states in this zone will be much more different compared with those in other zones. Thus, the values of R
, and E Although it may appear to be taking a long time, it will not able to bring any loss because that the levels control is a time delayed slow process.
Additionally, when calculating cross-correlation coefficients, the length of the sliding window (W ) is a key parameter, which has a great influence on the results. Fig. 7 shows the calculating results with different values of W . It can be found that if the value of W is too low, false alarms appear in the normal system. As the length is increased, the number of false alarms decreases, but the DT increases.
In addition, the training condition is also a key factor in the results. Table III previously. The FPR is defined as the ratio of the false positive number to the total number of normal instances in the testing dataset. FNR is defined as the ratio of the false negative number to the total number of abnormal instances in the testing dataset. DA denotes the accuracy in all of detected outliers, which is defined as the ratio of the total number of abnormal instances in the testing dataset to all the detected outliers [7] . Although the metric of FNR is very low in any situation, FPR is very different. In more detail, false alarm appears frequently in normal operation conditions if BP-NN is trained with insufficient data, and it can be decreased by enlarging the size of the training set. But as it has already met the demand of the training error, there are only a few improvements when the size of dataset is larger than 1600. Particularly, there are another two additional methods to improve the training performance in this system: Consider as many the kind of operation conditions as possible, and avoid having a mass of similar data in the training set.
2) Detection Ability and Performance Under Different
Attack Scenarios: In ICPSs, there are two ways to inject cyber-attacks into the physical systems, one is by accessing the network between the supervisory and control layers, and the other is by accessing the network between the control and physical layers [35] . Therefore, three typical attack scenarios, including spoofing attack, replay attack, and tampering attack [7] , [36] , are designed to analyze the detection ability and performance of the proposed method. 1) Detection Ability: To verify the detection ability of the proposed approach when multiple variables are invaded, a replay attack [36] is injected into the CTCS. More precisely, the attack continues to intercept all the data from sensors to PLSs inz 2 , and then retransmits it all at one. There are two situations where the attacker can select the retransmission time. First, if the system behavior is periodic then replay the data at a periodic point. Otherwise, replay the data at an arbitrary time. The results are shown in Fig. 8 , where the replaying sequence of system states starts at the time of 214 for the first situation, and at 274 for the second. It can be found that, althoughz 2 is infected, as the simulated data follows the change of actual states in the first situation, the system can work correctly, and there will be no anomaly emerging. However, the anomaly arises after seven intervals of sampling period in the second situation. Thus, two main conclusions can be determined: The proposed method has the ability to process the anomaly with multiple variables invaded, and only when the attack causes system anomaly can deviation be observed. 2) Detection Performance: Accuracy and real-time capability are the two most important criteria for evaluating the performance of detection systems. In this part, three attack scenarios are designed to evaluate the detection performance. The results are shown in Table IV , where the settings of the spoofing attack and the replay attack are similar to those mentioned previously, the tampering attack is used to alter the state of L 1 or L 2 from the sensor to the PLC. These results show that the approach can detect the anomaly with reasonable accuracy under each attack scenario. But there are some differences of the DT. It shows that detecting the spoofing attack takes the longest time, and detecting the tampering attack takes 2) The DT is determined by the response speed of the physical system, and the anomaly can be found before the system moves into a hazard situation. 3) Each zone has the ability to catch anomalies. Some characteristics of the proposed method are discussed based on a comparison with other existing methods, and the results are shown in Table V . It can be found that most other methods that focus only on physical states cannot detect the anomaly caused by the spoofing attack considered in this paper. Also, few of the existing methods have all of the facilities of the approach discussed in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
Anomaly detection is essential and important for cyber protection in ICPSs. Due to the characteristics of ICPSs, physical domain features should be fully considered in any anomaly detection system. A zone-partition-based anomaly detection method was presented in this paper to address this issue. This is different to other approaches as the proposed approach divided the physical system into multiple zones, and detected anomalies by analyzing and matching the crucial states observed in different zones. In addition, the method of approximating the zone function overcomes the difficulty of building the physical system models of ICPSs. In this approach, an automatic zone partition method was presented first. Then, a method of zone function approximation by constructing a BP-NN was given. On the basis of the approximated zone function, the way of analyzing anomalies was designed. Finally, experiments illustrated the high-accuracy and effective real-time performance of the proposed approach.
Current research work only takes the anomaly in physical domain into account. An integrated anomaly-based intrusion detection needs to also consider attack identification, and the information in cyberspace. Therefore, further work will focus on the integration of cyber information and physical feature for intrusion detection in ICPSs.
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